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This paper analyzes the daily participation decisions of Syrian archaeological workers 
in 1938. Our unique data affords us the opportunity to study the sign and size of the 
intertemporal labour supply elasticity as the daily wage workers received had a 
stochastic element which consisted of payments for finds that the worker made on 
each day of the dig. The value of these finds we argue represented transitory 
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  1I. Introduction. 
 
This paper analyzes the daily labour supply or absence decisions of workers 
employed on an archaeological dig in North East Syria in 1938.  We argue that this 
particular labour market is an attractive one to study if the sign (and size) of the inter-
temporal labour supply elasticity is of interest.  In broad terms workers will respond 
to wage changes by increasing their labour supply if this response can be seen solely 
as a substitution effect. This can be achieved if the wage change is sufficiently well 
anticipated that the worker builds the change into his or her permanent income, so the 
wage change when it is observed does not entail any (permanent) income shift. This 
can also be achieved when the wage shift is purely transitory, in which case there will 
be negligible effects on income.  Our data affords us the opportunity to study this 
elasticity as our daily wage data has a stochastic element which consists of payments 
(which were called bakshish) for finds that the worker makes on each day of the dig.  
This unforeseen element in remuneration we argue allows us to identify the effect of 
transitory wage shocks on labour supply. We also argue that there won’t be significant 
countervailing aggregate supply effects, in the sense of extra workers entering the 
market as potential remuneration increases. As far as we are able to establish the 
archaeologist directing the dig took on a pool of workers at the start of the dig and 
didn’t make significant additions subsequently, indeed it appears that the number of 
worker employed fell. 
  
We will focus on the labour supply of these workers at the extensive margin , 
that is whether they chose to participate on a given day.  In this sense our paper is 
similar to studies of the labour supply of food vendors at baseball games by Oettinger 
(1999). We have little direct data on worker effort in this inter-temporal context, the 
interested reader should consult Treble(2003) on this point. However we have in mind 
that that the archaeological workers are faced with a routine task of digging in a 
systematic and careful fashion for items.  He has no particular reason to think that 
digging extra fast with involve more finds - and hence higher wages – since he has no 
idea whether he will find some objects or not.  In this situation he will work at a 
steady pace and take whatever comes along.  Anecdotal evidence support the view 
that archaeological workers are actually encouraged to work in this way, because if 
they work ‘too fast’ they may miss some small object.  From the standpoint of our 
  2economic model this is a very convenient feature of the situation as it means that the 
worker is not making decisions on any effort margin, he is simply deciding whether to 
supply his labour on a given day – conditional on their past bakshish payments.   
 
The study is facilitated by the careful record keeping of the eminent 
archaeologist Max Mallowan (MM) and the fortunate survival of his pay book 
recording daily wage payments to his site workers in his excavation of the 
archaeological site at Tell Brak in Syria in 1938.  Over a period of nearly two months 
during this dig MM in that year kept incredibly detailed handwritten records, of the 
daily labour supplied by each worker and the resulting wage payments made to each 
worker. A small section of this pay book has been scanned and appears in Figure 1 
below. 
 




reading along the first line this worker received a total payment of 353 mejidi (the 
local currency) for his weeks work, 55 in bakshish and 298 basic pay. 
 
II.  The Literature on Intertemporal Labour Supply. 
 
The literature on the intertemporal labour supply elasticity as it stands doesn’t 
give a clear message on the estimated value of inter-temporal elasticity.  Early 
estimates of life cycle models which used panel data – for example Altonji (1986) - 
  3suggested that this elasticity is really very small.  However many early studies in this 
literature used annual changes in hours worked in response to annual wage changes, 
and as has been suggested by some researchers in the area that it seems doubtful that 
the measured annual wage changes is either fully anticipated or purely transitory. To 
try and overcome these problems some subsequent studies have tried to exploit 
specific aspects of certain labour markets to identify the effects, and this study is in 
this vein. 
 
Camerer et al (1997) studied the daily labour supply decisions of New York 
City cab drivers.  They argued that the demand for taxi services is subject to large 
transitory shocks due to the weather.  They use this ‘exogenous’ shift in demand to 
estimate a negatively significant wage elasticity.  In other words they claimed that cab 
drivers hare very short time horizons and will be more like to quit work when they 
receive an sudden, unanticipated increase in daily income. 
 
Oettinger (1999) also analyzes the daily labour supply behaviour of food and 
beverage vendors at a single stadium over an entire baseball season.  Quite rightly 
Oettinger suggests that the wage data he observes will be endogenously determined.  
He uses observable shifts in product demand (as measured by attendance at the game 
and other characteristics of the match) to instrument for the vendor wage.  He finds 
positive elasticity estimates of between .55 and .65.  Hence he suggests that a stadium 
vendor is much more likely to supply his labour at the next game if he or she 
anticipates a higher wage.  Oettinger argues that wage determination in these 
situations is clearly endogenous (this is his main criticism of the Camerer paper) as 
both demand conditions and vendor labour supply decisions will determine the 
observed wage. Oettinger takes account of this in his estimation. 
 
   The model of intertemporal labour supply can be tested in a situation in 
which individuals receive truly random transitory shocks to their earnings, if the 
shock is purely transitory and relatively small then there will be no significant income 
effect, this is essentially the aspect of the market for cab rides that Camerer et al were 
trying to exploit. We would also like to observe such data over a considerable time for 
a large enough group of workers to facilitate practical estimation.  Finally we would 
like to be able to find data in which the actions of the agent supplying the labour are 
  4independent of the market forces of labour supply and demand.  We think we have 
found such data in our sample of archaeological workers since our bakshish payments 
are random components which depend on finds on a daily basis and they do not 
impact on the daily base wage.  Hence we do not need to seek the ‘demand shifter 
variables’ that Oettinger (1999) advocates are necessary for identification. 
 
  The bakshish payments follow a particular stochastic structure. An initial 
“good” find (above the average in terms of value) is unanticipated, thereafter the 
expected value of subsequent finds follows and autocorrelated structure the nature of 
which is well understood by the workers. So the worker anticipates a higher expected 
value of his finds at day t+1 if he had a higher than average find at day t. 
  
In what we do we will in fact use only the bakshish payments for our analysis 
and ignore the base wage which is completely determined by the daily rate.  In 
addition we will find it more convenient to model the absence decision rather than the 
labour supply decision since we have no variation in hours worked within the day as 
all workers either worked the whole day or not at all.  
 
III.  Background Information on the Labour Market for Archaeological 
Workers. 
 
MM was from the traditional school of archaeology. He was trained by the 
eminent archaeologist Lord Leonard Woolley who was the Keeper of the Ashmolean 
Museum.  ‘he dug systematically to ensure comparison with finds at complementary 
sites both geographically and chronologically.’  McCall (2001b), p53.   
 
The pattern of aggregate bakshish payments is reported in Figure 2  As one 
might expect that the finds would be modest at the start of a dig until a specific depth 
was reached. However the level of payments seems to have been relatively constant 
for the first three-quarters of the dig. There is evidence that MM was adjusting the 
prices (upwards) for finds in the early days of the dig, we interpret this as him trying 
to set prices at the point at which workers would chose to sell the find to him rather 
than try and smuggle finds off site, which would run the risk of sacking. Later on MM 
  5made less such adjustments, we presume that he judged he had found the correct 
level. 
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The pattern of daily labour supply over the course of the dig is graphed in 
Figure 3 in terms of the number of workers who work on any given day in the dig.  
The five ‘weeks’ of the dig are clearly distinguishable as there is a clear cycle to each 
week.  Within each week labour supply starts off low (or absence is high) at the 
beginning of the week and builds slowly during the week until attendance is highest 
on the last day of each week – which is payday.  Over the life time of the dig, from 
week I to week V  the number of workers employed slowly falls as the work involved 
in the dig slowly exhausts itself. In wage book itself there are a few number of 
workers employed for a prior week (which was in fact in 1937, almost a year before 
the main dig in which it appears the site was marked out ready for the main work)  
 
We argue that the demand for labour (per day) by MM is fixed and constant 
and the labour supply decision is an individual one. Naturally, in reality, there is a fair 
degree of unobserved heterogeneity involved in the nature of supply and demand. On 
the demand side it may be the case that: unexpectedly large finds require extra 
workers, dangerous digging conditions necessitate extra workers to solve a problem at 
short notice, the unforeseen absence or sickness of some workers dictates that 
additional workers are required at short notice, agricultural crop harvests mean 
workers return to their villages, or weather conditions change in an unforeseen way 
and this delays or prevents work and this has knock on effects.  On the supply side the 
individual may be unable or unwilling to supply their labour on a given day for a 
variety of reasons associated with family or village obligations and other personal 
factors. However MM doesn’t seem to have imposed any extra penalties on workers 
who absent themselves on particular days and then return. 
 
What is the financial nature of an archaeological expedition ?  MM would 
typically ‘cobble together’ funds for his expeditions from a number of sources.  The 
precise sources of funds are not detailed for the expedition to Brak are not recorded.  
However the account in McCall (2001a) may be typical of how an expedition was 
funded. ‘He spoke to the Director of the British Museum, … who consulted with his 
Trustees.  They were happy to sponsor him, but only in a small way.  He had more 
luck with Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, the Chairman of the British School of 
Archaeology in Iraq, which put up £600.  ….The Percy Sladen Memorial Fund made 
  7a grant of £400 towards the funds required for excavating Tell Arpachiyah. ‘ McCall 
(2001), p.84.  The total funds now then stood £1100 and MM thought it would be 
‘less difficult to find the remainder’.  MM then wrote a brochure describing the nature 
of his proposed expedition and its importance to prospective backers.  It brought in 
the rest of the funding. We are also told that Agatha was often a backer for MM. 
Agatha ‘…also supported the excavations as an anonymous sponsor….. Sometimes 
she donated the rights of a detective story to the excavations’.  p.13, Trümpler (2001c) 
 
This illustrates that the funding for expeditions was hard to come by, usually 
put together from a variety of sources, planned well before hand within a strict budget 
often scrutinized long before the expedition took place, and subject to a specific 
overall budget constraint. 
 
 
III. A Model of Labor Supply and Bakshish Payments. 
 
The characteristics of the bakshish payments are that they were payments 
based on finds made each day.  On every consecutive day the finds were recorded in 
the pay book and each man would then receive his extra bakshish pay along with his 
regular pay at the end of the week.  This is clearly described in several passages: 
 
‘The bakshish payable to each man was recorded in a little book held by Michel, and 
at the end of each week the man’s wages plus his accumulated tips were paid over .  
For example a cylinder seal – he made sure the finder was properly rewarded.  On 
the other hand, he occasionally awarded small sums for worthless items as a means of 
encouragement’.  p.109 , McCall (2001a) 
 
‘To encourage the workman to keep a sharp eye open and dig with great care, Max 
paid bakshish for every good find. They were intrigued by the difficulty of predicting 
how he would assess an object. The little boys whose job it was to look through the 
contents of the baskets of soil a second time in search of finds could earn as much 
money in this way as a grown spademan or a pickman. Every afternoon, just before 
work ended, the workmen lined up to show Max any special finds. If these items found 
favour with him, he would write down the sum earned beside each name in a book, 
  8and when pay-day came the bakshish was paid out along with the regular working 
wage. Every worker remembered exactly what he was owed and would put the record 
straight if he was paid too little or even too much.’ ’  p.188-9, Trümpler (2001b) 
 
There seems to have been little scope for cheating this bakshish system either 
by digging where one was not assigned to or by trying to sell finds outside. Digging 
outside limits was monitored:  
  
‘The dig in Tell Brak was extremely successful, producing a quantity of objects of 
very high quality. In the last season of digging, during the autumn of 1938, however, 
there was a serious incident that clearly illustrates the potential dangers of such 
excavations and at the same time gives a glimpse of the mentality of the local people. 
  Many finds of beautiful animal amulets in stone or ivory had earned the 
workers plenty of bakshish. Since bakshish represented good additional earnings, the 
idea of the money undoubtedly induced some of the men to try their hand at forgery 
now and then. On the dig in Tell Brak, however, the animal amulets led to something 
much worse. They were found at a certain depth in a shaft that was supposed to be cut 
straight down from the top. However to get at the area containing the amulets as 
quickly as possible the men started undercutting at the bottom of the shaft, without 
permission and indeed against Max’s express orders. During a midday break some of 
them crept into the shaft from the far side of the mound. And went on with the 
undercutting, planning to say that the figures were finds from their own part of the 
site and earn bakshish for them. But the overhang broke away, burying five men, and 
only one of them was brought out alive. After the matter had been settled with the 
sheikh and the French security officer, Max posted a guard at the scene of the 
accident, fearing further illicit digging. He himself waited out of sight during the next 
day's midday break, and caught three more workmen in the act of coming to dig at the 
same spot. The rest of the men showed little respect for the dead, making fun of them 
in song and gestures. The members of the archaeological team had already noted on 
other occasions that death counted for very little in these countries.’  p.202-3, 
Trümpler (2001b) 
 
We also know from sources that there was a fair degree of monitoring of what 
the workers were doing.  Agatha herself spent a lot of time observing the workers and 
  9acted like a spy – reporting workers who were hiding or asleep and taking photos !.  
Hence we do not think it would have been easy for any worker to smuggle out of the 
site any find to try and sell it on the black market.  Also we do not know if such a 
black market in these objects would have existed. 
 
  We argue that these Bakshish payments represent transitory and unanticipated 
wage shocks to workers at an individual level and as such should induce a positive 




IV An Economic Model 
 
We will assume that on each day the worker has the choice between attending work or 
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a and b are concave functions with   and  '(.) 0 '(.) 0 ab >> ''(.) 0 ''(.) 0 ab < < .  T is the 
stock of time, h contracted hours and xt earnings. The central element of the situation 
we are analysing is the stochastic structure of these earnings. We will examine this 
first. We know that daily earnings were made up of two components, base pay  
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t k is the worker’s realised bakshish payment at time t. We assume that this quantity is 
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and similarly for larger values of t, however, the conditional expectation 
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the probability of absence will be negatively related to past bakshish.   
 
 
V.  Econometric Estimation. 
 
The labour supply margin which we propose to use to analyse the possible 
intertemporal behaviour of these workers is their attendance at work. The empirical 
link we are examining is whether there exists a link between level of the payments the 
worker obtains and his individual probability of attending. The appropriate 
econometric structure we argue is a discrete panel data model which has been used in 
the analysis of absence patterns before, see Barmby, Orme and Treble (1992,1995) 
and Barmby (2002). 
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Accordingly, we model the incidence of absence of a worker from the site 
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This structure allows us to model the probability of the event of a worker not 
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for symmetric CDF, where F is the CDF of v. 
 
As the above indicates the probability of absence is determined for each 
individual by the value of the latent variable  . This is assumed to be a function of 
the lagged Bakshish payment 
*
it d
1 it k − , and the lagged attendance indicator,  . The 
error has a components-of-variance structure, with   representing a time-invariant, 
individual-specific unobserved component, and   is the remaining error. 




Assuming that   is a realisation of a random variable u with PDF   in the 
population, a marginal likelihood can be formed by integrating out  in the following 
way 
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where F is the CDF of the Logistic distribution corresponding to  . The unobserved 
term, u, is assumed to be distributed as a standard normal variate. This is the random 
effects model, the estimates of which we report shortly. An alternative empirical 
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In one sense a histogram of estimates the estimates  i α  can be seen as a non-
parametric estimator of the distribution of unobserved effects. Both estimations are 
reported here. Accounting for unobserved effects here will be important as we have 
some limitations on what we can observe about individual workers  
 
We observe bakshish payments for workers on days that they work and enter 
the lag value in the regression component of the probability. Clearly we don’t observe 
bakshish payments when the worker doesn’t work, so there is a problem of what value 
to use when specifying the probability of absence when the worker was absent the 
previous day, in the estimates reported here we simply take the last observed bakshish 
payment. 
 
Another econometric problem is whether there was any compositional effects 
in the gangs and if it mattered who you were working alongside.  This is a problem 
because we are unclear how the gangs really operated.  Naturally, if largely the same 
people work together for several weeks then ways of working and pattern of 
cooperation may evolve.   For example, if a large find is made by one worker then a 
cooperative digging effort may develop as an efficient response to a large amount of 
digging effort being required to unearth a given object.  In such a  situation – if effort 
had been cooperative – then the resulting bakshish for the object would be shared.  
This is apparent in the pay book at certain points when large sums of an identical 
nature were paid to several workers.  This kind of cooperation is likely to be higher if 
people have worked together before.  The issue for the econometric work is how this 
unobserved heterogeneity can be measured?  Our suggestion is that we proxy this 
  13potential for cooperation by using the data to illuminate how often the same workers 
have worked together.  This information is in the data as it records – on each day – all 
the workers who were working in each gang by name.  Hence it is possible to 
calculate on any given day what proportion of workers the individual has worked with 
before in the same gang. We haven’t addressed this in our estimations yet  
 
Another issue worth considering is that we should control in our analysis for the 
cumulative amount of money a worker has earned up to a specific point in time.  This 
may be important as in agrarian economies it is possible that a farmer might divert 
energy to earning a wage on an archaeological dig only until a specific sum of money 
has been made to fund the purchase of seed or some equipment or indeed to meets the 





VI Empirical Analysis. 
 
Before the empirical analysis can begin we need to carefully describe the nature of 
the data.  We have detailed records on a daily basis for each worker, on a named 
basis, relating to their bakshish payments.  The data is organised in gangs so we know 
which workers are in each gang.  There were to 42 gangs working in week I, but only 
20 by week V. The typical size of a gang was 9 workers but in the last week one gang 
was only 3 workers.  The largest gang was 10 workers.  The composition of the gangs 
changed quite considerably over the course of the dig. 
 
When a worker is absent this was carefully recorded.  When a worker was 
sacked this was also recorded. Sacking did not seem to be a permanent state as some 
workers returned to work on a later date.  One conceptual problem we have is 
distinguishing between different types of labour supply and absence.  Some workers 
are absent for the odd day or two within the week.  Others do not supply their labour 
for a whole week or more.  Clearly there are different patterns of labour supply 
choices being exhibited here. Those workers who quit for a week or more may well be 
returning to more distant villages to tend to family or agricultural duties.  Those who 
  14are absent for a day or two within a given week are more likely to be ill, not inclined 
to work that day or be those workers whose home is not so far distant and may be able 
to return to it by absenting themselves for only a day. 
 
There is also limited evidence in the pay book that there may be family type 
decisions taking place as often workers with the same family name but a different 
Christian name will appear in the same gang.  Then in different weeks these 
individuals with the same surnames may absent themselves.  It is possible that there is 
some kind of family labour supply decision with brothers of fathers and sons sharing 
the archaeological dig work that is available with meeting family and other 
agricultural commitments. 
 
Workers work for a period ‘weeks’ beginning on a specific day and working 
for up to eight and a half days.  Hence the week is not a conventional week.  Then 
there was a rest day and following that the next ‘week’ would start.  The structure of 
the weeks was as follows: 
 



















I   28/3/38  4/4/38  8  1  8  42  342 
II 7/4/38  14/4/38  8  9  16  37 290 
III 17/4/38  24/4/38  8  17  24  31  258 
IV 28/4/38  3/5/38  7  25  31  29  242 
V 7/5/38  14/5/38  8  32  39  20  166 
 
We are still not certain about exactly how the week was structured.  The day 
off was reported to be Tuesday but this is not confirmed by the pay book.  
‘Although it was not easy to control so many different nationalities, speaking several 
different languages, Max succeeded in organizing the dig without any major 
incidents. His diplomacy was required, for instance, to settle the delicate matter of  
  15the day of rest. The Muslims, who outnumbered the Christians, wanted it to be Friday. 
The Armenians on the other hand, refused to work on Sunday. Finally Max decided to 
make Tuesday the day of rest, since no practicing religion had its feast-day on 
Tuesday.’ p.188, Trümpler (2001b) 
 
It is clear from the pay book that there is a high degree of turnover with 
workers coming and going a lot.  Also the composition of the gangs changed a lot – 
although for the most part there was at least one or two names which remained the 
same throughout most of the weeks.  It is conceivable that this person was a gang 






Table 2: Summary Statistics of Data  (NT = 8829) 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min   Max 
Absence   0.0445         0.2062     0  1 
Bakshish (k)  7.8287        12.2147          -8         252 
 
 
Figure 4 graphs the daily absence rate at the dig over the 39 days of the dig.  
Again we can clearly see the cycle of the week’s activities as absence is higher at the 
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A simple investigation of the relationship between Bakshish payments over 
successive time periods reported in Tables 3a, b show that there is autocorrelation of 
these payments over time.  As one might expect the payment of Bakshish on any one 
day is statistically associated with payments of the previous day even if the order of 
the day in the cycle of the dig is controlled for.  We might expect this to be the case if 
a worker begins unearthing a collection of related objects within a small location he 
will go on working on this area in successive days. 
 
Table 3a:   Estimation of   1 tt kk t α ρ − =+ + ε    (NT = 8829) 
 
Variable  Coefficient  (SE)   Coefficient (SE) 
Const  5.1196 (0.1497)    1.1072 (0.2336) 
Bakshish (k)t-1 0.3581 (0.0113)     0.2905 (0.0114) 
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Table 3b: Estimation of  1 tt kk t α ρε − =+ +  
                   (NT = 8829) with fixed effects for days 
 
Variable Coefficient(SE)   
Const 6.0223  (0.1435) 




Tables 4a and 4b set out the main results of the labour supply or absence 
decision.  We estimate the model described in the previous section relating to the 
probability of each worker working on each specific day. In total our model is 
estimated for 823 workers over a total of 8829 working days.  Both the logistic and 
the logistic model with unobserved heterogeneity and the fixed and random effects 
models indicate that there is a negatively significant effect of lagged Bakshish 
payments on the probability of absence the next day.  The size of the coefficient 
varies between -.05 and -.0528 according to the specification.  The final specification 
in last column of Table 4a is an attempt to control for both the weekly effects we 
graphed in Figures 3 and 4 and the cycle of natural cycle of the dig.  Hence we use 
dummies to control for: the first day in each week, each week of the dig and these two 
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Table 4a: Model for Daily Probability of Absence.  
                 Standard Errors in Brackets (N = 823, NT = 8829) 
 






Constant  -3.6989   (0.1200)  -3.9473   (0.1891)  -4.2873   (0.2734) 
Lag Absence    4.4298   (0.1645)    4.0343   (0.2514)  4.3480   (0.2726) 
Bakshisht-1 -0.0500   (0.0161)     -0.0504   (0.0164)  -0.0528   (0.0218) 
Start week II      0.0220   (0.6207) 
Start week III      2.6299  (0.3853) 
Start week IV      2.6706   (0.3521) 
Start week V      2.2367    (0.5113) 
Week II      -0.2412   (0.2508) 
Week III      -0.3453   (0.2622) 
Week IV      -0.0141   (0.2634) 
Week V      0.2499   (0.3226) 
Start weekII*lagbak      0.1318  (0.0466) 
Start weekIII*lagbak      -0.0127 (0.0759) 
Start weekIV*lagbak      0.0616 (0.0452) 
Start weekV*lagbak      0.0419 (0.0353) 
σ              0.7908  (0.2349)  0.9119 (0.2411) 
LnL   -973.6717  -971.3413  -887.4383 
 
Table 4b: Fixed effects Model for Daily Probability of Absence.  
                  Standard Errors in Brackets (N = 120, NT = 1995) 
 
Variable  FE  Logistic 
Lag Absence    1.9686   (0.1728) 
Lag Bakshish  -0.0627  (0.0193) 
LnL   -504.9457 
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These estimations still show clearly that we have a negatively significant 
coefficient on the lag of Bakshish payments. Hence the results clearly indicate a 
negative effect of the value of the lag bakshish payment on the probability of absence.  
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for the estimation we have done the value of the elasticity is between 0.1012 (for the 
random effects model) and 0.1202 (for the fixed effect) . These are very similar to the 
figures obtained both by Altonji (1986) and MaCurdy (1981)    
 
VII  Conclusions. 
 
We have used a unique dataset which has by chance survived from 1938 to 
analyse the labour supply of archaeological workers on a dig in north-east Syria in 
that year. By piecing together knowledge on the way in which these workers were 
paid, we are able to present results which we argue are consistent with the theory of 
intertemporal labour supply. That is, if workers receive unanticipated and transitory 
shocks to their wage rate they will increase their labour supply in response or 
alternatively be less likely to be absent on the following day. 
It should be stressed that these results are at present preliminary as there 
remains further econometric investigation to carry out.  Firstly we would wish to 
examine the possibilities that the membership of gangs and who one works with 
might make a difference to bakshish payments.  Secondly we would wish to assess 
whether the level of cumulative aggregate payments to any individual worker might 
affect their bakshish payments.  Finally although we have treated out data exclusively 
as if it were a model of absence behaviour.  One could alternatively think of this as a 
model of labour supply.  This further work would require us to work with notional 
daily wages instead of simple bakshish payments.  This would have some 
disadvantages but one important advantage – namely that of being able to explicitly 
estimate a inter-temporal labour supply elasticity which would be directly comparable 
  20to the rest of the literature.  This further work remains on the agenda for the next 
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